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I. INTRODUCTION
FOLLOWING A highly debated and often inconsistent historyin the lower federal courts, in 1999, the Supreme Court pro-
claimed that the Warsaw Convention created an exclusive cause
of action and provided the sole remedy to passengers injured in
international air transport.' That same year, the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) promulgated the Montreal
Convention, establishing unified rules to replace the various
agreements of the Warsaw System in international aviation regu-
lation.2 However, the Montreal Convention represented a stark
shift in policy for the international aviation legal regime.
Whereas the Warsaw Convention was birthed at the advent of
the aviation industry and reflected States' interests in promoting
industry growth by limiting carrier liability, the Montreal Con-
vention codified a new emphasis on protecting passenger
rights.3 While much of the language of the two treaties is identi-
1 See El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter War-
saw Convention].
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage
by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S.
309 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
3 See discussion infra Part III.B.
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cal, and while the Montreal Convention has attempted to clarify
ambiguities in the Warsaw Convention, questions still remain as
to the scope of actions and remedies available under the Mon-
treal Convention. One subtle yet critical issue arising from the
debate pertains to the jurisdiction of federal courts. In particu-
lar, federal courts have struggled to interpret the language of El
Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng in the face of a plaintiffs motion
to remand a case originally removed from state court on the
basis of complete preemption. Complicating the matter is the
fact that the United States now operates under a hybrid system
in which the Montreal Convention has superseded the Warsaw
Convention in most, but not all, cases.5 Consequently, courts
that viewed Tseng as opening the door for removal of claims aris-
ing out of international air carriage under the older Warsaw Sys-
tem have carried this interpretation over to the modernized
Montreal Convention.6 However, other courts narrowly con-
strue the scope of the treaties, allowing passengers to bring art-
fully pleaded state law claims in lieu of federal claims, thereby
avoiding the conditions and limits of the treaties and remaining
in state court.
This article attempts to resolve the dispute. Part II presents a
discussion of preemption, distinguishing between the effects of
conflict preemption and the "complete preemption" doctrine.
Part III introduces the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions,
briefly comparing their historical development and the parallel
provisions of the two treaties. Part IV reviews the Supreme
Court's landmark decision El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, while
Part V illustrates the divergent interpretations of the Conven-
tions in light of Tseng. Finally, Part VI attempts to reconcile the
split of authority regarding complete preemption in interna-
tional aviation litigation in favor of the passenger by focusing on
the provisions of the newer Montreal Convention and its passen-
ger-centric themes.
II. THE FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. FEDERAL LAW AS THE "SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND"
The basis for the preemption doctrine is the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution, which states:
4 525 U.S. 155.
5 See discussion infra Part III.B.
6 See discussion infra Part V.B.
7 See discussion infra Part V.A.
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This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.'
By virtue of this provision, every federal law has the power to
preempt state law. But this provision is not as broad-sweeping as
it may seem. Courts confronted with the task of applying both
state and federal law are directed to disregard state law in favor
of the federal rule only if the two are in direct conflict-that is,
only where applying state law would necessitate violating federal
law.' Thus, scholars have asserted that the Supremacy Clause
actually provides three separate rules ofjudicial interpretation. 0
First, the rule of applicability makes valid federal law part of the
same body of jurisprudence as state law." Second, the rule of
priority declares that within that body of jurisprudence federal
law is "supreme."12 Finally, "a global non obstante provision" di-
rects "courts not to apply the traditional presumption against"
preemption "in determining whether federal law contradicts
state law."13
The canonical interpretation of the Supremacy Clause was
originally delivered in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, in which
the Supreme Court held that a claim "arises under" federal law
so long as a question of federal law "forms an ingredient of the
original cause."14 But federalism concerns caution against pre-
emption of state laws unless Congress has demonstrated its in-
8 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
9 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 252 (2000) ("Under the
Supremacy Clause, any obligation to disregard state law flows entirely from the
obligation to follow federal law.").
1o Id. at 261.
11 Id. at 246.
12 Id. at 251. ("[T]he rule of priority comes into play only when courts cannot
apply both state law and federal law, but instead must choose between them.").
13 Id. at 255.
[T]he non obstante provision does caution against straining the
meaning of a federal law to avoid a contradiction with state law.
Unless there is some particular reason (over and above the general
presumption against implied repeals) to believe that Congress
meant to avoid such a contradiction, the Supremacy Clause indi-
cates that the content of state law should not alter the meaning of
federal law.
Id. at 256.
14 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
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tent for a statute to have such effect. Courts have struggled to
determine when and where this intent truly exists, as the next
section reveals.
B. THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Early preemption jurisprudence generally held that congres-
sional action in a field automatically preempted all state law in
that field." In making this determination, courts looked to the
scope of the statutory scheme to determine the breadth of the
"field" Congress intended to occupy.'" The broader a court's
interpretation of a field, the more state law was displaced by fed-
eral law and vice versa. Field preemption could be expressed or
implied by Congress, and courts even held deliberate silence to
constitute Congress's intent to prohibit state legislation of a par-
ticular subject.17 Thus, courts were initially unwilling to apply
state law "in coincidence with, as complementary to or as in op-
position to, federal enactments."" Since every act of Congress
necessarily inhabits some "field," federal legislation was seen as
having an exclusive effect which "ipso facto supersede [d] existing
state legislation on the same subject."19
Gradually, the Court's approach shifted from merely defining
the field Congress intended to occupy (with a general presump-
tion of preemption) to conducting an investigation as to
whether Congress actually intended legislation to have a pre-
emptive effect on state law.20 Eventually, this inquiry was codi-
fied as a two-pronged test21 through which the Court found
federal law preempted state law where (1) Congress intended
15 See, e.g., Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926); Or.-Wash.
R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 102-03 (1926); Pa. R.R. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919); Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. v. Varn-
ville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915); S. Ry. v. R.R. Comm'n of Ind., 236
U.S. 439, 446-47 (1915).
16 See Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
17 Varaville Furniture, 237 U.S. at 604 ("[S] tate law is not to be declared a help
because it attempts to go farther than Congress has seen fit to go.").
18 Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346 (1927).
19 S. Ry., 236 U.S. at 446; see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238,
299-300 (1936) (recognizing that congressional power to regulate local interests
automatically denies the states that same power).
20 See Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 351-52 (1933); see also Stephen A.
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767, 767 n.3 (describing
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), and Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941), as "the loci classici of modem preemption doctrine").
21 See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985).
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such result (2) but limited to the extent state law actually con-
flicted with federal law.2 2 Under the first prong, congressional
intent to preempt state law may still be expressly stated or may
be inferred by the court.2 ' However, the strong presumption
against preemption has been a common maxim of the Court.2 4
Under the second prong, state law is considered to conflict with,
and is therefore nullified by, federal law either when "compli-
ance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impos-
sibility"25 or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of Congress."2  It should be noted that congressional in-
tent is antecedent to statutory conflict in the Court's
preemption analysis. Indeed, the Court noted, "[W]e have con-
sistently emphasized that the first and fundamental inquiry in
any preemption analysis is whether Congress intended to dis-
place state law."27 Accordingly, neither the absence nor the
presence of state law on a subject has been found to support an
implication of preemption by subsequent federal legislation.
Likewise, the comprehensive nature of federal legislation is not
dispositive as to the preemptive intent of Congress.29
C. THE "COMPLETE PREEMPTION" DOCTRINE
Unlike the substantive preemption described above, "com-
plete preemption" is a facially procedural doctrine.so Whereas a
court conducts substantive preemption analysis to determine
when and whether to apply federal law in lieu of state law on the
22 Fid. Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-53 (1982);
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746-47 (1981).
23 Nelson, supra note 9, at 226-27.
24 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992).
25 Maryland, 451 U.S. at 747 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963)).
26 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971) (The Supremacy Clause invalidates "any state
legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law.").
27 Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6 (1986).
28 Compare California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 736 (1949) (absence of state law
implies Congress merely intended to fill a void, not to preempt state law), with
N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 414 (1973) (commonality of
existing state legislation implies non-preemptive intent).
29 Dublino, 413 U.S. at 414 (refusing to infer preemption). But cf Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (inferring preemption).
30 Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 943 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The use of the term
'complete preemption' is unfortunate, since the complete preemption doctrine
is not a preemption doctrine but rather a federal jurisdiction doctrine.").
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same subject, complete preemption analysis is conducted to de-
termine whether a federal court has jurisdiction to hear claims
removed from state court.3' The plaintiff, as master of the com-
plaint,12 may choose the forum in which to bring his claims and
may assert whichever claims he chooses. 3 In fact, it is com-
monly recognized that trial courts in a plaintiffs home state pro-
vide the plaintiff with the most sympathetic recourse for
justice.3 To combat this "home-field advantage," a defendant
sued in state court may remove the case to federal court, but
only upon showing that the federal court had original jurisdic-
tion over the case in the first place. Since state courts are
courts of general jurisdiction whose ability to hear cases runs
concurrent to that of federal courts, 6 the mere preemption by
federal law of some of the claims in a plaintiffs complaint does
not automatically provide a basis for removal jurisdiction." Fur-
thermore, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, defendants
cannot generally remove a case by asserting federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction as a defense."
Complete preemption, however, allows the defendant to re-
move a case-notwithstanding the plaintiffs jurisdictionally in-
sufficient pleading-on the basis that the claims are
"necessarily" and "exclusive [ly]" federal. In such cases, a civil
defendant will invoke complete preemption as an affirmative de-
fense in order to justify removal of his case to a "friendlier" fed-
eral forum.4 0 The result is that the federal "court will
recharacterize the plaintiffs state cause of action as a federal
31 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
32 The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); 14B CHARLEs
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2009).
33 Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. R.A. Ridges Distrib. Co., 475 F.2d 262, 264
(10th Cir. 1973) ("It is for the plaintiffs to design their case as one arising under
federal law or not, and it is not within the power of the defendants to change the
character of plaintiffs' case by inserting allegations in the petition for removal.").
34 Dugas v. Jefferson County, 911 F. Supp. 251, 253 n.1 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (cit-
ing WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3721).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a).
36 Id.; WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3522.
3 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (To be sure, a plaintiff
"may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.").
- Id. at 398-99.
3 Kaucky v. Sw. Airlines Co., 109 F.3d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 1997) ("When federal
law creates an exclusive remedy for some wrong, displacing any remedy that the
states may have created for it, a suit to redress that wrong necessarily arises under
federal law.").
-o See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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claim for relief, making removal proper on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction."4 1
1. Finding Complete Preemption
Although the procedural effect of complete preemption is
quite well-settled, courts are widely divided on the substantive
issue of finding complete preemption where state and local laws
run concurrently. 42 In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated that the "touchstone" for finding complete preemp-
tion is "the intent of Congress."4 3 It further noted:
[O]ur decision should not be interpreted as adopting a broad
rule that any defense premised on congressional intent to pre-
empt state law is sufficient to establish removal jurisdiction. The
Court holds only that removal jurisdiction exists when, as here,
"Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of ac-
tion ... removable tofederal court." In future cases involving other
statutes, the prudent course for a federal court that does not find
a clear congressional intent to create removal jurisdiction will be
to remand the case to state court.44
The resulting test-whether Congress intended a claim to be
removable-created ambiguity as to the scope of the complete
preemption doctrine that lasted for more than fifteen years. 5
However, the Court recently changed its focus from the "remov-
ability" of a claim to whether Congress intended that a federal
cause of action be exclusive. 6 Thus, "[w] hen [a] federal statute
completely pre-empts [a] state-law cause of action, a claim which
41 Ell v. S.E.T. Landscape Design, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 188, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
see also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3722.1.
42 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3722.2 (concluding that the
wide "divergence among lower federal courts as to the contexts in which com-
plete preemption is applicable ... indicated that the Supreme Court cases on the
subject had failed to create clear rules for identifying completely preempted
claims").
4 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987).
- Id. at 67-68 (Brennan, J., concurring).
4 Compare, e.g., Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co.,
858 F.2d 936, 940 (3d Cir. 1988) (complete preemption applies where Congress
not only preempts state law, but also supplies a replacement cause of action
through which plaintiffs might seek redress for the alleged injury), and Willy v.
Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1988) (same), with, e.g., Deford v.
Soo Line R.R. Co., 867 F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1989) (the complete pre-
emption rule turns on the breadth of the preemptive provision), and Graf v. El-
gin, Joliet & E. Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).
46 Beneficial Nat'1 Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6-8 (2003); see also Gil
Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 537, 552 (2007).
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comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded
in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law" and is
removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.47
2. Federalism Concerns Arising From Complete Preemption
"Congress's mere act of creating a federal right and eliminat-
ing all state-created rights in no way suggests an expansion of
federal jurisdiction so as to wrest from state courts the authority
to decide questions of pre-emption under the [relevant federal
statute].".48 While "the question respecting the extent of the
powers actually granted [to the federal government] is perpetu-
ally arising, and will probably continue to arise,"4 9 the Court has
very narrowly construed federal legislation related to "tradi-
tional state interest[s]."o Indeed, the Court has limited the reg-
ular application of the complete preemption doctrine to the
fields of ERISA, NLRA, NBA and Tribal claims.51 Yet recent ap-
plication of the complete preemption doctrine has resulted in
sweeping elimination of passengers' state law claims against in-
ternational air carriers, including claims that admittedly fall be-
yond the scope of the governing national law.-2 Specifically, the
Supreme Court was persuaded that the Warsaw Convention's
"comprehensive scheme of liability rules" and "emphasis on uni-
formity" preempted a plaintiffs claims for psychosomatic and
psychological injuries arising out of an invasive security search. 3
As noted by University of Michigan Assistant Professor of Law
Gil Seinfeld, removal jurisdiction "helps prevent state court hos-
tility to claims grounded in federal law from undermining the
purposes these laws are intended to serve, and it helps to secure
uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal
4 Anderson, 539 U.S. at 8.
48 Id. at 19 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
41 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
50 E.g., Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 445 (1963)
(recognizing protection of consumers as an area of traditional state concern).
51 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 32, § 3722.2.
52 See El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999) (the Warsaw
Convention completely preempts state law causes of action, thereby eliminating a
passenger's state law claims even if they fall beyond the scope of the Convention);
see also Husmann v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 169 F.3d 1151, 1153-54 (8th Cir.
1999) (affirming lower court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand case re-
moved from state court under complete preemption defense); Knowlton v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., No. RDB-06-854, 2007 WL 273794, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2007)
(Montreal Convention's comprehensive scheme completely preempted passen-
ger's breach of contract claims under state law).
53 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 169.
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law."54 Ironically, the Court was not facing a removal jurisdic-
tion challenge in Tseng, and thus complete preemption was not
at issue in the case. However, the Tseng Court's decision has
been interpreted to stand for the proposition that the Montreal
Convention and the Warsaw System completely preempt state
law in cases arising out of international aviation.55 Before evalu-
ating the merit of this premise, it is valuable first to examine the
provisions of the treaties in question.
III. THE WARSAW SYSTEM AND THE
MONTREAL CONVENTION
A. THE WARSAW CONVENTION-ESTABLISHING A
SYSTEM OF UNIFORMITY
With more than 135 signatories, the Warsaw Convention es-
tablished a universal system of rules for regulating international
air travel.5 6 The Convention was originally adopted in 1929, fol-
lowing two meetings of the International Aviation Law Confer-
ence in Paris and Warsaw." Established during the infancy of
commercial aviation, the Convention had two primary objec-
tives: (1) to establish a system of uniformity for ticketing and
claims in international air transport, and (2) to limit the liability
of air carriers in order to prevent large personal injury and
wrongful death suits from crippling the burgeoning industry.58
Indeed, in the preamble of the Convention, the signatories "rec-
ognized the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the
conditions of . .. the liability of the carrier.""
Chapter I of the Warsaw Convention establishes the scope of
the treaty, limiting its applicability to "international transporta-
tion," which is defined as any flight departing from the territory
of one party to the convention and arriving in the territory of
another party to the convention, or departing and arriving in
the territory of one country where there is an agreed stopping
54 Seinfeld, supra note 46, at 542.
5 See, e.g., Knowlton, 2007 WL 273794, at *4 (recognizing that the Tseng Court
did not address removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption doctrine,
but interpreting the adaptation of Tseng as having a completely preemptive effect
in international aviation cases).
56 Montreal Convention, supra note 2.
57 MONTREAL CONVENTION, intro. I 1 (Elmar Giemulla & Ronald Schmid eds.,
Supp. 6 2010) [hereinafter Giemulla & Schmid].
58 Id.
59 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
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point in the territory of another country.o In Chapter III, the
Warsaw Convention establishes the rules defining international
air carrier liability with respect to: injuries sustained by persons;
loss, destruction, or damage to baggage or goods; and damage
due to delay."1 Specifically, Article 17 imputes liability to air car-
riers for "damage sustained in the event of the death or wound-
ing of a passenger ... ,if the accident which caused the damage
. . . took place on board the aircraft or in the course of . . .
embarking or disembarking."6 2 Article 18 assigns liability to the
carrier for damage to checked luggage and goods sustained
while the carrier is in possession of the luggage or goods. 3
Under Article 19, a carrier is liable for damage to passengers,
luggage, or goods caused by delay.64 Article 20 relieves a carrier
of liability under Articles 17, 18, and 19 if the carrier can show it
took "all necessary measures" to avoid the accident, even if the
damage was caused by negligent pilotage.6" Article 21 of the
Convention reduces a carrier's liability in the event a passen-
ger's injuries are attributable to the passenger's own contribu-
tory negligence.6 6 Article 22 originally set the monetary limits
for the liability of the air carrier at $8,300 for each passenger,
$17 per kilogram for checked baggage and goods, and $332 per
carry-on bag. 67 However, Article 25 eliminates the protections
and limitations on liability for carriers established under the
Convention where an injured party could show his injuries were
caused by the willful misconduct of the carrier or one of its
agents or employees acting within the scope of employment.68
6o Id. art. 1.
61 See id. arts. 17-19.
62 Id. art. 17.
63 Id. art. 18.
64 Id. art. 19.
65 Id. art. 20. Scholars caution against the literal interpretation of this provi-
sion, since harm would never occur if a carrier literally took all the necessary
measures to prevent it. Thus, this provision has been interpreted as requiring
those "reasonable measures that prudent foresight would have envisaged." I.H.
PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAw 123 (8th ed. 2006).
66 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 21.
67 The Convention utilized French francs as the baseline currency. See id. art.
22. Thus, the limits on liability were actually set at 125,000 ff per passenger, 250
ff per kilogram, and 5,000 ff per carry-on bag. Id. art. 22. The values listed above
are the whole-number conversions of these values based on 1929 currency rates.
SeeJanice Cousins, Note, Warsaw Convention-Air Carrier Liability for Passenger Inju-
ries Sustained Within A Terminal 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 369, 370 n.9 (1977).
68 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 25.
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Finally, Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention establishes the ex-
clusive nature of the Convention's provisions. It states:
1. In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for dam-
ages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the condi-
tions and limits set out in this convention.
2. In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preced-
ing paragraph also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to
who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what
are their respective rights."
Following its entry into force in February of 1933, the Warsaw
Convention suffered numerous attacks, first by air carriers for
being too restrictive;70 later by nations for imposing unaccept-
ably low limits on personal injury claims." Subsequent amend-
ments to the Convention attempted to resolve these and other
issues, but many were not signed or ratified by all States party to
the original Convention. Additional private agreements were
established, but they too had limited scope and applicability.
Consequently, the Warsaw Convention evolved into a series of
multi-lateral agreements and non-binding arrangements, apply-
ing different rules to different circumstances under different na-
tional and international laws.
69 Id. art. 24.
70 Giemulla & Schmid, supra note 57, intro. 2.
71 Id.
72 Compare the Hague Protocol, Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention,
Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371, with the Montreal Convention, supra note 2.
The increases in liability limits proposed by the Hague Protocol were so far below
the limits proposed by the United States that it renounced the Warsaw Conven-
tion entirely in 1965, but withdrew its renunciation following the increases in
liability established by the Montreal Agreement. See also Protocol to Amend the
Warsaw Convention, Mar. 8, 1971, ICAO Doc. 8932/2, 10 I.L.M. 613 [hereinafter
Guatemala Protocol] (signed by 21 States); cf Additional Protocol No.1 (2, 3, 4)
to Amend the Warsaw Convention, Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Docs. 9145-48 [herein-
after Montreal Protocol No. 1 (2, 3, 4)]. Proposed in 1975, the United States did
not ratify Protocols 1, 2, and 4 until 1999, and has never ratified Protocol 3. In
contrast, Germany has not ratified Protocol 4, but German courts have ruled on
it at least once, where the parties agreed to grant the court jurisdiction over the
matter. See Giemulla & Schmid, supra note 57, intro. 1 12.
73 For example, the Montreal Convention only applied to the carriage of pas-
sengers to and from the United States, and to stopovers in U.S. territory. See
Giemulla & Schmid, supra note 57, intro. 1 8.
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B. THE MONTREAL CONVENTION-PUTTING THE
PASSENGER FIRST
By 1997, the ICAO had begun the task of creating a uniform
system of liability rules to replace the patchwork Warsaw Sys-
tem. 74 During the May 1999 International Conference on Air
Law, participants finalized the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal Con-
vention),7 which, upon entry into force, would supersede the
Warsaw System76 between all signatories to the new treaty, as
well as for all international flights originating and terminating
in the United States.77 The Montreal Convention was immedi-
ately viewed as a successful codification of U.S. international-air-
carriage-policy objectives.
Like the Warsaw Convention, Chapter I of the Montreal Con-
vention defines the scope of the treaty. The language and effect
of Article 1, including the definition of "international carriage"
is essentially unchanged. Similarly, Chapter III sets out the
conditions for carrier liability and establishes the limits on com-
pensation for damages. However, the language and the effect of
the provisions of Chapter III are substantially different than in
the original Warsaw Convention. Article 17 establishes carrier
liability for death or bodily injury to passengers and damage to
checked and unchecked baggage-but distinguishes between
"accident[s] ... on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking" that cause per-
sonal injury and "event[s] . . . on board the aircraft or during
any period within which the checked baggage was in the charge
of the carrier" that cause damage to baggage. 0 Article 18 im-
putes liability to carriers "in the event of the destruction or loss
of or damage to, cargo" caused by an "event" during "carriage by
air. "81 Article 19 describes the liability of a carrier for damages
caused by delay of passengers, baggage, or cargo, and provides
74 Montreal Convention, Letter of Submittal,June 23, 2000, S. Treaty Doc. No.
106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309.
75 Id.
76 This includes the original 1929 Convention, "any of its amendments and





80 Cf id. art. 17(1)-(2).
81 Id. art. 18(1).
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for carrier exoneration only where the carrier took all reasona-
ble steps to avoid such damages. 2
Under Article 21, the strict liability of carriers for personal
injury claims is limited to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights
(SDR), a substantial increase from the limits of the Warsaw Con-
vention.8 3 Further, carriers may be subject to unlimited fault-
based liability for injuries in excess of 100,000 SDR, but may
avoid such claims by showing the passenger's injury was solely
due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a
third party.8 4 Article 22 limits the allowable recovery for claims
under Article 19 (delay) to 4,150 SDR and further limits the car-
rier's exposure for damage to baggage to 1,000 SDR.8 5 For dam-
age to cargo under Article 18, carrier liability is capped at 17
SDR per kilogram.86 None of the limits of Article 22 apply if the
passenger can prove the damage resulted from an intentional or
reckless act of the carrier. Finally, under Article 20, the carrier
may escape liability under any Article to the degree it proves the
passenger was contributorily negligent in causing the injuries
sustained.
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention parallels Article 24 of
the Warsaw Convention, creating an exclusive effect on claims
arising under concurrent law. It reads:
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for
damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or
in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to
the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this
Convention . . . . In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any
other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.89
The Montreal Convention currently has ninety-three signato-
ries"o and supersedes the Warsaw Convention in States that have
82 Id. art. 19.
83 Id. art. 21; see also Giemulla & Schmid, supra note 57, intro. 1 11.
84 Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 21(2).
85 Id. art. 22(1)-(2).
86 Id. art. 22(3). This limit may be lifted if the passenger declares a value
greater than that allowed. Id.
87 Id. art. 22(5). Intentional or reckless behavior of the carrier's servants or
agents may impute liability where the servant or agent acted within the scope of
his or her employment. Id.
88 Id. art. 20.
89 Id. art. 29.
90 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, LEGAL AFFAIRS AND ExTERNAL
RELATIONS BuREAu, LIST OF PARTIES AND DEPOSITARY (2003), http://www.icao.
int/icao/en/leb/mt99.pdf.
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adopted both treaties.91 "Like its predecessor, the Montreal
Convention's purpose is to promote uniformity in the laws gov-
erning airliner liability for the 'international carriage of per-
sons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft.' "92 However,
since the aviation industry has "matur[ed] into a powerful,...
insurable business," the Montreal Convention foregoes the War-
saw Convention's emphasis on protecting air carriers in favor of
a regime that balances the interest of passengers in equitable
recovery for injuries sustained with the interests of businesses in
predicting exposure to liability." Nevertheless, the emphasis on
uniformity pervading both treaties continues to influence
courts' interpretations of the preemptive effects of the treaties'
provisions.
IV. THE MISLEADING LEGACY OF EL AL ISRAEL
AIRLINES, LTD. V. TSENG 4
A. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Tsui Yuan Tseng sued El Al Israel Airlines (El Al), a foreign
corporation owned by the state of Israel, for personal injury
sustained during an "intrusive security search" 6 conducted by El
Al personnel in the El Al terminal at JFK Airport, and further
alleged property damage for loss to her luggage conducted dur-
ing the search.97 Tseng alleged she was physically sick and upset
91 Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 55.
92 Serrano v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CV 08-2256 AHM (FFMx), 2008 WL
2117239, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2008).
93 Giemulla & Schmid, supra note 57, intro. 1 1; see also Weiss v. El Al Isr. Air-
lines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
94 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
95 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Tsui Yuan Tseng at 1, Tseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines,
Ltd., 122 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997) (No. 96-7447).
96 "The term 'security search' refers to an intrusive search of a passenger's
body initiated after a routine check by metal detector and questioning have led
airline personnel to deem a passenger a security risk." Tseng, 122 F.3d at 101. In
this case, Tseng was instructed to remove her jacket, shoes and sweater, and to
lower her jeans to mid-hip level. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 95, at 3.
Thereafter, a female security guard manually searched Tseng, including the
touching of her breasts and groin, in the presence of at least one male security
guard. Id. at 4. Her belongings were also searched in a separate room beyond
her observation. Tseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 919 F. Supp. 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). The search lasted approximately ten to fifteen minutes, and the entire
detention lasted more than one hour. Brief for Plaintiff - Apellant, supra note
95, at 3. Ultimately, Tseng was cleared and was allowed to board the plane. Id. at
5.
97 Id. at 1.
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throughout her flight to Tel Aviv as a result of the preceding
search and that throughout her month-long visit to Israel she
was "emotionally disturbed." 8 Tseng also alleged, upon arrival
in Tel Aviv, she was unable to locate numerous personal items
that had been in her luggage and that items of her clothing
were stained and damaged as a result of the search. 9 After re-
turning to the United States, Tseng visited her family physician
who, over the course of "a few months,"100 treated Tseng for
headaches, upset stomach, ringing in her ears, nervousness, and
sleeplessness allegedly resulting from emotional distress over
the airport security search."o'
Tseng filed suit in the Supreme Court of the State of New
York.1 0 2 El Al removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (d)o10 on
the ground that El Al was a "foreign state" as defined under 28
U.S.C. § 1603.104 The district court held that the personal inju-
ries sustained by Tseng were the result of an "accident" as de-
fined by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, and thus, El Al
was not liable, since recovery for psychosomatic manifestations
of emotional injuries is not permitted under the Convention.'
The district court further held that the damage to Tseng's lug-
gage was also a result of an "accident" and limited El Al's liability
to $1,034.90 pursuant to Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention. 10
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed
and remanded in part, holding first that, because "accident"
does not include the normal operation of the aircraft or the pro-
cedures followed by airline personnel in the normal course of
air travel, Tseng's injuries did not fall within the scope of Article
98 Tseng, 122 F.3d. at 101.
99 Tseng, 919 F. Supp. at 157.
100 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 95, at 6.
101 Tseng, 919 F. Supp. at 157.
102 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 95, at 1.
103 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (2008)
Actions removable generally ... Any civil action brought in a State
court against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this
title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.
104 As defined by § 1603, a "foreign state" includes a corporation in which a
foreign state holds a majority ownership interest, and which is not "a citizen of a
State of the United States."
105 Tseng, 919 F. Supp at 158 (citing E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552
(1991)).
106 Id. at 160.
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17 of the Warsaw Convention.1 07 Consequently, the Second Cir-
cuit held that the Warsaw Convention did not preclude Tseng's
state-law claims because the events giving rise to the injury fell
outside the Convention's protection of carriers. 08 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.o The
Warsaw Convention preempts personal injury actions under
state law, even if the injuries are not compensable under the
Convention."'
B. OPINION OF THE COURT
1. Majority
The majority opinion began its analysis by focusing on Article
24 of the Warsaw Convention."' Turning to the original French
text of the provision, the Court determined "les cas prevus a
l'Article 17"-literally translated to "the cases anticipated by Arti-
cle 17"-referred to all personal injury claims arising out of acci-
dents that occur on board an aircraft or during the processes of
embarking or disembarking.' 1 2 Furthermore, the Court found
that the reference to Article 17 merely distinguished claims for
personal injury from those for damage to luggage (under Arti-
cle 18) or goods (under Article 19)."' Recognizing the provi-
sion itself was somewhat ambiguous, the Court turned to
precedent to support its interpretation.
In Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.," 4 the Court previously
determined that the drafters of the Warsaw Convention estab-
lished rules for determining when a carrier was liable for inju-
ries it caused a passenger but left to state law the "determination
of the compensatory damages available to the suitor.""'5 In
Tseng, the Second Circuit had interpreted Zicherman to mean
that "the [Warsaw] Convention expresses no compelling interest
in uniformity that would warrant us in supplanting an otherwise
applicable body of law . . . .""6 Writing for the Tseng Court,
107 Tseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d. 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1997).
108 Id. at 107-08.
109 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 161 (1999).
110 Id. at 176.
II Id. at 167.
112 Id. at 167-69.
"' Id. at 168.
114 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
115 See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 170 (citing Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 231).
116 Id. at 156 (discussing Tseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 107 (2d
Cir. 1997)).
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Justice Ginsburg explained that Zicherman instead stood for the
proposition that the Warsaw Convention determines whether or
not liability exists by imposing conditions for recovery.1 17 The
Court then endeavored to interpret how to determine whether
liability exists under the Convention by examining the liability
provisions in light of the treaty's "complementary pur-
pose [s].""* As the minutes from the Second International Con-
ference on Private Aeronautical Law suggest, the drafters of the
Warsaw Convention sought to "achiev[e] uniformity of rules
governing claims arising from international air transporta-
tion""' in order to strike a balance between passenger inter-
ests-in recovering for personal injuries-and airline
interests-in limiting liability.12 0 The Court concluded that "al-
low [ing] passengers to pursue claims under local law when the
Convention does not permit recovery . .. would encourage art-
ful pleading by plaintiffs" in an attempt to avoid the Conven-
tion's limits by pleading claims in exclusively state-law terms. 12 1
Predictability in assessing exposure to liability, the Court
opined, would be best maintained by leaving to the signatories
the function of adjusting liability limits under the Warsaw Con-
vention. 1 2 2 Consequently, the Court held "that the Warsaw Con-
vention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for
personal injury damages under local law when her claim does
not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention"
and reversed the decision of the Second Circuit.'12
117 See id. at 170.
118 Id.
119 See E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991). Early drafts submit-
ted to the conference at Warsaw proposed carrier liability "in the case of death,
wounding, or any other bodily injury suffered by a traveler." SECOND INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL LAw MINUTES, OCTOBER 4-12,
1929, WARSAW 264 (Robert C. Horner & Didier Legrez trans., 1975). The final
version of Article 17 substantially narrowed airline liability to encompass only
bodily injury caused by an "accident." See id. at 205. The Court found this highly
persuasive, stating, "It is improbable that, at the same time the drafters narrowed
the conditions of air carrier liability in Article 17, they intended, in Article 24, to
permit passengers to skirt those conditions by pursuing claims under local law."
Tseng, 525 U.S. at 173.
120 Tseng, 525 U.S. at 170.
121 Id. at 171.
122 Id. at 171 n.12.
123 Id. at 176.
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2. Justice Stevens's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Stevens distinguished between personal
injury claims arising out of accidents and personal injury claims
arising out of "non-accidents." After agreeing with the Court
that Article 24 preempts state law personal injury claims arising
out of accidents, he then criticized the majority's over-reliance
on the Warsaw Convention's uniformity goal to justify its hold-
ing that non-accident claims were similarly preempted. 2 1 Point-
ing to the clear language of Article 25, Justice Stevens argued
that the majority's broad interpretation of the Convention's pre-
emptive effect was undercut by the Convention's simultaneous
relegation of "willful misconduct" cases to state law.' 2 5 By al-
lowing the diverse regimes of the States party to the Convention
to govern the cases arising out of a carrier's willful misconduct,
he posited, the drafters clearly had not contemplated preemp-
tion of allstate-law claims within the Convention's scope.'2 ' Fur-
thermore, Justice Stevens recognized that the number of "non-
accident" personal injury cases was expectedly small, and thus,
allowing local law to govern such cases would not have the dis-
ruptive effect on uniformity predicted by the majority. 2 7
V. TURMOIL IN THE LOWER COURTS-COMPLETE
PREEMPTION IN LIGHT OF TSENG
Scholars and courts alike have recognized that the issue of
complete preemption supporting removal jurisdiction was not
before the Tseng Court.12 8 Nevertheless, subsequent decisions
by lower courts have, at times, relied upon Justice Ginsburg's
opinion in Tseng to support their conclusion that removal juris-
diction is proper in cases where the claims asserted by the plain-
tiff arise out of international air transportation. 129 By framing
the issue in Tseng as whether the "Warsaw Convention 'provides
the exclusive cause of action for injuries sustained during inter-
national air transportation" and then answering in the affirma-
124 Id. at 177-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 178.
126 Id. at 180.
127 Id. at 179.
128 E.g., Serrano v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CV 08-2256 AHM (FFMX), 2008 WL.
2117239, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2008); Jonathan E. DeMay, Recent Developments
in Aviation Law, 73 J. AIR L. & COM. 131, 200 (2008). While El Al did in fact
remove the case from New York state court, it did so under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
Tseng v. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 122 F.3d 99, 101 (2d Cir. 1997).
" See infra note 149.
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tive, the Court opened the door for future judges to read the
decision as a justification for complete preemption in interna-
tional air transport cases."'o Indeed, "[n]umerous courts of ap-
peals have now acknowledged that a preemptive federal
regulatory regime must provide the exclusive cause of action for
a particular harm in order for the rule to take hold." 3 1 Because
cases addressing the Montreal Convention are sparse, the com-
mon law principles that evolved under the Warsaw Convention
remain instructive.1 3 2 The following section illustrates the grow-
ing split of authority regarding removal jurisdiction under the
Montreal Convention, and its predecessor the Warsaw
Convention.13 3
A. COURTS IN THE 2ND, 5TH, 7TH, AND 9TH CIRCUITS HAVE
REJECTED COMPLETE PREEMPTION
Recent decisions in the district courts of the Second, Fifth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits reject the idea of removal jurisdic-
tion under the complete preemption doctrine. 1 34 A Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals case, Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, pre-
dates but is not overruled by Tseng. 3 5 Here, it serves as the cor-
nerstone example for those courts permitting plaintiffs to bring
state-law claims for injuries arising out of international air
carnage.
Joseph and Edythe Wolgel each purchased a roundtrip ticket
from Mexicana Airlines for travel between Chicago, Illinois, and
Acapulco, Mexico.1 3 6 On April 17, 1981, after confirming their
reservations, the couple arrived at O'Hare Airport and
presented their tickets and luggage to the ticket agent but were
130 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001).
131 Seinfeld, supra note 46, at 552-53. See, e.g., Miles v. Okun, 430 F.3d 1083,
1088 (9th Cir. 2005); City of Rome v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168,
177-78 (2d Cir. 2004); King v. Marriot Int'l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir.
2003); Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 775-76 (5th Cir. 2003).
132 Serrano, 2008 WL 2117239, at *3 (citing Shah v. Virgin Ad. Airways, Ltd.,
473 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Although the Warsaw Convention no
longer applies to claims arising after the effective date of the Montreal Conven-
tion, the case law developed under the Warsaw Convention is still regarded as
applicable in the interpretation of equivalent language in the Montreal
Convention.")).
133 See Knowlton v. Am. Airlines, No. RDB-06-854, 2007 WL 273794, at *5 (D.
Md.Jan. 31, 2007) (acknowledging the split and concluding that the line of cases
supporting complete preemption is most persuasive).
134 See infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
135 821 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1987).
136 Id. at 443.
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"bumped" because there were no seats available on the flight. 3 7
Shortly thereafter, the Wolgels submitted a claim for boarding
compensation, which Mexicana refused.1 3 ' Five years following
the incident, the Wolgels filed claims in Illinois state court for
breach of contract, tortious breach of a contractual relationship,
and discriminatory bumping in violation of the Federal Aviation
Act.'3 9 Mexicana, a corporation wholly owned by the govern-
ment of Mexico, removed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and
then moved to dismiss the claim, asserting that the action was
barred by the Warsaw Convention's two-year statute of limita-
tions. 4 0 The district court granted Mexicana's motion and dis-
missed the claim, and the Wolgels timely appealed."'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the district court, finding the Wolgels' claims fell outside the
scope of the Warsaw Convention and holding that the Conven-
tion does not preempt causes of action beyond its scope.14 2 In
its decision, the Seventh Circuit examined the language of Arti-
cle 19, which provides, "the carrier shall be liable for damage
occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of passengers,
baggage, or goods."1 4 3 Determining that the Convention was si-
lent as to whether claims arising from the "total nonperform-
ance of a contract" fell within the term "delay," the court looked
to the drafting history of Article 19.144 The court then con-
cluded such claims did not arise under the Convention, citing
the consensus among the delegates at the Second International
Diplomatic Conference on Private Aeronautical Law that "there
was no need for a remedy in the Convention for total nonper-
formance of the contract, because in such a case the injured
party has a remedy under the law of his or her home country."145
The court considered the Wolgels' claims to have arisen directly
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. The Wolgels' claims arose under § 404(b) of the Act, which prohibited
air carries from imposing "any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasona-
ble prejudice or disadvantage" upon any person. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(b)
(1982) (repealed 1983).
- Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 443; see Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1602-11 (1982).
141 Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 443.
142 Id. at 446.
143 Id. at 444.
144 Id.
145 Id. (citing SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AERONAUTICAL
LAw, MINUTES OCrOBER 4-12, 1929, WARSAW, supra note 119, at 76-77 (remarks
of Mr. Ripert)).
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from the discriminatory bumping and not from any consequent
delay.'4 6 Since the Warsaw convention does not provide a cause
of action for discriminatory bumping, the court held the claims
were not barred by the Convention's statute of limitations.4 7
Therefore, the court looked to state law to determine the appro-
priate limitations period, and subsequently held that Illinois'
five-year "catch-all" provision was "most appropriate.""' Conse-
quently, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the deci-
sion of the district court."' 9
Despite the fact that Wolgel preceded Tseng, the Tseng decision
did not overrule Wolgel. Courts have continued to rely on Wolgel
as representing the proposition that claims outside the scope of the
Warsaw Convention may be brought in state courts if state law
gives rise to a cause of action.15 0 However, this line of cases has
been criticized as an unjustified departure from the completely
preemptive effect of Tseng, as illustrated below.'
146 Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 445.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 446; see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-205 (2009).
149 Wolgel, 821 F.2d at 446.
15o See, e.g., Serrano v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. CV 08-2756 AHM (FFMx), 2008
WL 2117239, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2008) (rejecting the idea that the preemp-
tive effects of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions necessitate complete pre-
emption); O'Callaghan v. AMR Corp., No. 04 C 4005, 2005 WL 1498870, at *1
n.1 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2005) (breach of contract claim was not preempted by the
Warsaw Convention because the "claim s[ought] damages only for the nonper-
formance of the contract, not for any injury that occurred because of that non-
performance"); Dorazio v. UAL Corp., No. 02 C 3689, 2002 WL 31236290, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 2002) (Warsaw Convention did not completely preempt state
law); Fournier v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 191 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1003 (N.D. Ill.
2002); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 661, 671 (N.D. Tex. 2001)
(remanding case because uniformity in the context of the Warsaw Convention
"relates to the remedy available, not to the forum adjudicating the remedy"); see
also Donkor v. British Airways Corp., 62 F. Supp. 2d 963, 970 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(because defendants failed to establish plaintiffs claims were preempted by the
"substantive scope" of the Warsaw convention, removal was improper).
151 See Marotte v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2002) (dis-
missing plaintiffs state law claims as time-barred under the Warsaw Convention
after case was removed from Florida state court); see also Knowlton v. Am. Air-
lines, No. RDB-06-854, 2007 WL 273794, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2007) (persuaded
by the reasoning of those cases finding in favor of preemption); Singh v. Am.
Airlines, 426 F. Supp. 2d 38, 45 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying remand because "the
[Warsaw] Convention completely preempts those claims which fall within its
scope").
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B. COURTS IN THE 2ND, 4TH, 8TH, AND 11TH CIRCUITS HAVE
PERMITTED COMPLETE PREEMPTION
The decision in Husmann v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.1 52 illuS-
trates the general analysis undertaken by federal courts in the
Second,"'s Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits permitting re-
moval jurisdiction on the basis of complete preemption.
While boarding a Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight from
London, England, to St. Louis, Missouri, Robert Husmann
tripped over luggage and injured himself.154 One day later, on
October 6, 1991, Husmann arrived at his destination, but did
not file suit until April 17, 1997.155 Husmann filed his com-
plaint against TWA in Missouri state court, alleging injuries
under Missouri tort law.15 6 TWA removed the case to federal
district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, on the basis of fed-
eral question jurisdiction.1 5 7 TWA argued that Husmann's state
law claims were completely preempted by the Warsaw Conven-
tion, and thus the case was removable, notwithstanding the "well
pleaded complaint rule."' The district court denied Hus-
mann's motion to remand the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and granted TWA's motion for summary judgment,
finding Husmann's claims were time-barred by the Warsaw Con-
vention's two-year statute of limitations.15 9  Husmann timely
appealed.16  .
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the district court, holding that state law causes of action are
completely preempted by the Warsaw Convention.'6 1 In its deci-
sion, the majority relied heavily on decisions by the Second1 2
and Fifth1 6 3 Circuits. Specifically, the majority found that the
152 169 F.3d 1151 (8th Cir. 1999).
153 Singh, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 38, facially appears to overrule Donkor, 62 F. Supp.
2d at 963, but Donkor should be read to support the proposition that removal is
proper only where the removing party carries its burden of establishing that the
plaintiffs state law claims are completely preempted, and thus Donkor is not in
conflict with Singh.




158 Id.; see Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
159 Husmann, 169 F.3d at 1151-52.
160 Id. at 1152.
161 Id. at 1153.
162 Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs. Inc., 148 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1998).
163 Potter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 98 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 1996).
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other circuits had accurately concluded that "allowing state
causes of action for death and injuries suffered by passengers on
international flights would frustrate" the "announced goals of
the Warsaw Convention"-namely uniformity and certainty in
the law governing international air carrier liability. 6 4 The ma-
jority also noted the Supreme Court's decision in Tseng as rein-
forcing, if not controlling, the Eighth Circuit's findings.165 It
further relied on the Court's holding in Tseng-"the Warsaw
Convention provides the exclusive cause of action for injuries
sustained during international air transportation"-to rebut the
dissent's criticism of the majority's failure to follow the well-
pleaded compliant rule.16 6 Since the court found Husmann's
claims did fall within the scope of the Warsaw Convention, it
held they were completely preempted by federal law, and thus,
removal was proper.167 Consequently, the Eighth Circuit held
Husmann's claims against TWA were time-barred by the Con-
vention's two-year statute of limitations and affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court.16 8
VI. RESOLVING THE ISSUE IN FAVOR OF
THE PASSENGER
The Court in Tseng did not confront a complete preemption
defense and consequently, did not address the issue of whether
removal jurisdiction was proper under the complete preemp-
tion doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court's choice of language has
led litigators and judges to disregard this fact, instead focusing
on the Court's analysis of the exclusivity of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. Since Warsaw Convention jurisprudence substantially in-
fluences the interpretation of the Montreal Convention, this
error has carried over to the new regime. The result is a danger-
ous overstepping by the federal courts into cases more appropri-
164 Husmann, 169 F.3d at 1153.
165 Id. at 1153 n.5.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 1153.
168 Id. at 1154. The court also noted, despite TWA's multiple bankruptcy fil-
ings, that the statute of limitations on Husmann's claims was neither tolled under
Mo. REv. STAT. § 516.120 (1994) (five year statute of limitations), nor under the
Warsaw Convention, because state statutes of limitation are not tolled during
bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2) (action must be commenced within thirty
days after notice of termination of bankruptcy stay), and because the Warsaw
Convention's statute of limitations is '"not subject to tolling.'" Husmann, 169
F.3d at 1153-54 (quoting Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 143 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
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ately litigated in state courts. This trend can be reversed,
however, by appropriately narrowing the interpretation of two
key elements of the Montreal Convention-the causes of action
it provides and the recovery it allows.
A. SCOPING THE CAUSE OF ACTION-INSIDE OR
OUTSIDE THE TREATY REGIME
The language of the Montreal Convention enumerates three
exceptions to the Convention under which a passenger may
bring a claim against a carrier."'s Thus, by its own words, the
Convention declares it is not the exclusive cause of action for
passengers sustaining damages at the hands of an international
air carrier. Further, commentators have noted that the Mon-
treal Convention only supersedes other bases for claims for
damages "typically related to air carriage . . . and which can be
predicted to a certain extent by those who consciously expose
themselves to the dangers of air travel."170 Though federal
courts are often touted as being superior to state courts in the
practice of uniform interpretation and application of federal
law,"' this advantage is lost when the federal law provides an
explicit limitation on the application of state law. In the case of
the Montreal Convention, Article 29 extends the conditions and
limitations for claims related to "passengers, travel baggage and
goods" to bases for claims which may fall outside the Conven-
tion.172 National law therefore applies to any event resulting in
damage which does not fall within the scope of the Convention
(e.g., failure to perform a contract of carriage). 7 Thus, uni-
formity is achieved with respect to predicting a carrier's expo-
sure to liability. The Montreal Convention, in providing a strict
limitation on liability, whether founded in federal or state law,
ensures even state courts will effectively and uniformly apply the
Convention. Beyond the strict limits, a carrier has no justifiable
interest in limiting its liability, since the damages in such cir-
cumstances are preventable. 1 7 4 But determining whether or not
169 "[A]ny action for damages, however founded, whether . .. in contract or in
tort or othenise .... ".Montreal Convention, supra note 2, art. 29 (emphasis
added).
170 Giemulla & Schmid, supra note 57, art. 29 1 3.
171 See, e.g., Seinfeld, supra note 46, at 543-44.
172 Giemulla & Schmid, supra note 57, art. 29 1 6.
175 Id. art. 29 91 4-5.
174 To remove the cap on liability, a plaintiff must either prove the injury was
caused by fault on the part of the carrier or that the carrier acted willfully. Mon-
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a specific action falls within the scope of the Convention is not
the aim of this paper. Merely pointing out that some causes of
action are recoverable despite falling outside the scope of the
convention175 supports the premise that removal jurisdiction
does not exist where a passenger's claims are pled completely in
state law terms. In such cases, defendants may certainly move to
dismiss the plaintiffs claims on the ground of conflict preemp-
tion but should not be allowed to manipulate this defense to
establish removal jurisdiction where none exists.
B. How EXCLUSIVE IS "EXCLUSIVE"-STATE LAw REMEDIES
The Montreal Convention provides for the unification of cer-
tain rules related to international aviation. It is not necessarily
seen as unifying all rules related to international aviation.' 7 6
With respect to liability, the Convention establishes a unified sys-
tem of rules regarding passenger claims for personal injury,
wrongful death, loss or damage to baggage, loss or damage to
goods, and injuries resulting from delay.177 The Convention es-
tablishes the conditions for such claims, and sets limits on a
claimant's recovery when the conditions are met.178 The Con-
vention further recognizes defenses for willful misconduct and
allows for exoneration if a carrier can prove the claimant or a
third party was contributorily negligent.17 ' Finally, the Conven-
tion prohibits recovery of "punitive, exemplary or any other
non-compensatory damages."8 o
Clearly these limits effectuate the goals of uniformity and pre-
dictability by harmonizing the recovery schemes of the States
party to the Convention. A carrier's interests could undoubt-
edly be undermined by a regime that allowed plaintiffs to select
ajurisdiction in which to seek recovery, for example, where non-
compensatory damages were likely to bring a windfall. By limit-
treal Convention, supra note 2, arts. 21 1 1, 22 1 5. In either case, it is within the
carrier's power to prevent such injury.
175 E.g., "Claims for return of property and for unjust enrichment against the
air carner ... are not affected by Article 29 of the MC .... [Clases such as theft
... of goods that had been delivered for carriage ... can[not] be seen as com-
pensation claims within the meaning of the MC." Giemulla & Schmid, supra note
57, art. 29 1 17.
176 See El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 181 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
177 Montreal Convention, supra note 2, arts. 17-19.
178 Id. arts. 21-22.
179 Id. art. 20.
180 Id. art. 29.
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ing recovery under Article 21, and then again under Article 29,
the Montreal Convention provides state courts with a roadmap
for calculating a plaintiffs damages in cases arising under the
Convention, but leaves to state law the process of navigating to
the final recovery. "Since Article 29 is only intended to ensure
the exclusive application of the liability regime of Articles 17 to
19, conversely this means that there is no longer any justification
for a limitation on liability where the prerequisites of these pro-
visions are not fulfilled."' Furthermore, while Article 29 cate-
gorically proscribes recovery for non-compensatory damages, it
remains to be seen whether damages meant to compensate an
injured party in excess of his or her pecuniary losses will be per-
missible.' Regardless, a plaintiff must demonstrate the requi-
site fault or willful misconduct of the carrier in order to lift the
cap imposed by Article 21.1' Furthermore, even the Supreme
Court has recognized that the method of calculating the plain-
tiffs award is dependent upon state law.' Thus, courts should
not imply a completely preemptive regime from the holding in
Tseng. Since not all state-law claims are preempted in the first
place, it would be erroneous to interpret congressional intent to
establish removal jurisdiction based solely on the Montreal Con-
vention's limits on state-law recovery rules.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the emphasis on uniformity in the arena of interna-
tional aviation regulation codified in the Warsaw and Montreal
Conventions, courts should not interpret the treaties to have a
completely preemptive effect. In cases where plaintiffs assert
claims against international carriers caged in state-law terms, de-
fendants should not be able to remove the cases from state court
by merely asserting federal preemption of state law as a defense.
If all the claims asserted by the plaintiff are preempted by one of
the treaties, such assertions may justify the defendant's motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. This is sufficient recourse to en-
is Giemulla & Schmid, supra note 57, art. 29 1 15.
182 At least five states currently permit recovery on a non-punitive basis for
damages not otherwise founded in pecuniary loss. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.104
(2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-6 (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1601 (2009);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-10-101 (2009); WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.250 (2010).
183 Montreal Convention, supra note 2, arts. 21 1 1, 22 1 5.
184 El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 170 (1999); Zicherman v.
Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 231 (1996).
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sure fairness in the proceedings, and equally balances the
passenger's right to compensation with the carrier's interest in
protecting itself from excessive liability. Further limitations on a
passenger's right to assert state law claims in the courts of his
home state undermine the protective goals of the Convention
and encourage the expansion of a doctrine that the Supreme
Court has substantially limited since its inception.
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